Recall The Iraqi Army

Mr. President, last week a memorandum on the war on terrorism from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to his top subordinates was leaked to the press. In that memo, Secretary Rumsfeld asked a number of questions, including the following: Is our current situation such that "the harder we work, the behinder we get?" Then he asked: "What else should we be considering?"

Well, I am dismayed that Secretary Rumsfeld says publicly something so differently than what he has said privately. I am glad he is looking for new direction since our post-Saddam policy is not working well, given the sustained and increasing attacks on our forces.

Secretary Rumsfeld asked -- again -- "What else should we be considering?" Well, the President of the Iraqi Governing Council has made a specific recommendation for us to consider: that the regular Iraqi Army units be called up to assist our troops in providing security for the reconstruction of their country.

Surely it is worthy of our consideration, when Iyad Alawi, this month's serving President of the Iraqi Governing Council -- the 25-member body selected by the United States to represent the Iraqi people -- is making a suggestion to change course.

He wrote an important opinion piece entitled "America Must Let Iraq Rebuild Itself," which was published by The New York Times on October 19. The main premise of the article is that "ultimately, only Iraqis themselves can restore security, rebuild national institutions, enact a constitution and elect a democratic government."

I believe all of us would agree with that premise. For Mr. Alawi, the vital step is to "call up the Iraqi Army and the national police force [for] at least up to the mid-officer level" to deal with the insecurity and chaos in the country.

Mr. Alawi believes the Iraqi officer corps will have to be vetted to remove those who have committed crimes under the old regime. He points out that most of the Iraqi Army's soldiers are "Iraqi patriots who chose not fight for Saddam Hussein" and "would probably return to their units and contribute to their country's future." He argues that it would be "much easier and quicker to retrain and reequip them within their existing organizational structure than to start from scratch."

Mr. Alawi argues that these steps would not only relieve the burden on American troops but also would gain substantial good will among Iraqis.

Tom Friedman, writing in The New York Times, on October 23, is of a similar mind. He urges the administration to declare the following: "We thank all the nations who offered troops, but we think the Iraqi people can and must secure their own country. So we're inviting all former Iraqi Army soldiers (not Republican Guards) to report back to duty. For every two Iraqi battalions that return to duty (they can weed out their own bad apples), we will withdraw an American one. So Iraqis can liberate themselves. Our motto is Iraq for the Iraqis."

That is from Tom Friedman, who has been a very strong supporter of the administration's military actions in Iraq and the decision to attack Iraq.

The administration and the Coalition Provisional Authority have taken a different tack in reorganizing Iraqi security, particularly with regard to the Iraqi Army. They are essentially starting from scratch to build a completely new Army of 40,000 people who are being trained and equipped as a motorized infantry.

The goal is to form nine brigades by the end of 2004, but thus far only one battalion of 750 soldiers has been trained and equipped.

Additionally, the Coalition Provisional Authority is creating an Iraqi border patrol force, only 5,000 to date, with the need to expand to more than 20,000 sometime in the future. A 20,000-person Facilities Protection Service is intended to take over security at fixed site locations from coalition forces, and an Iraqi civil defense corps of 6,600, expanding to more than 15,000 in 2004, is being integrated into coalition military units to provide local intelligence and help with security patrolling.

While I have some questions regarding the need for four distinct security forces, including a new Iraqi Army, in addition to a new national police force, I am open to arguments that this approach to building a new army may be desirable in the long run. A better educated, trained, equipped, and motivated army, whose members are more representative of the diverse Iraqi population, and which was created expressly to serve the people of the new Iraqi state, may be more ideal.

However, in the short term, I believe Mr. Alawi's recommendation to reconstitute units of the old regular army is surely worthy of consideration. No one, including Mr. Alawi, argues for a continued role for those portions of the old army that were part of the repressive security apparatus of the Saddam regime -- units such as the Special Security Guards, the Special Republican Guards, and the Fedayeen Saddam.

In fact, those units were created by Saddam because he did not trust his regular army. In that portion of the State Department-sponsored "The Future of Iraq Project," dealing with Iraqi Armed Forces, the Working Group that wrote this part of the report, discussed this issue.

They noted the following: "Saddam Hussein realized, with his sense of security, that he will not be able to earn the loyalty and trust of the army with its varied character in spite of many attempts to purify or clean the army from the disloyal elements - as he called them - in order for the army to become an army of ideology to protect the party and the revolution and defend the nation's values." They added that "Thus the army remained a source of worry, suspicion and threat to Saddam; in spite of the fact that the army got into its many wars because Saddam desired it. There are some who think that the army was pushed into these wars to keep it continuously busy confronting outside aggressions." Finally and in view of these findings, the Woking Group concluded that "In any event we think it necessary to keep the basic structure of the army, which can be easily rehabilitated...."

That regular army, below the midofficer level, after vetting, could serve a useful role by putting trained Iraqi forces into the field to more quickly enhance overall security. The regular Iraqi Army was a sizable force of approximately 80,000 officers, 130,000 noncommissioned officers, and 400,000 conscript soldiers."

We probably made a mistake in formally disbanding the Iraqi army in May. I wonder if Ambassador Bremer doesn't tacitly believe the same, given the quick decision that was made by him shortly thereafter by agreeing to pay monthly allowances to officers and noncommissioned officers after the unrest that was unleashed by that decision. Beginning in July, monthly payments were made according to a rank-based scale, ranging from $50 for a noncommissioned officer to $150 for a general, somewhat below the base pay for the various ranks. Additionally, a one-time $40 stipend was paid to former conscripts. Since July, the Coalition Provisional Authority has paid from Iraqi funds approximately $78 million to about 260,000 individuals and just over $15 million to approximately 375,000 conscripts. The estimated cost for the stipend during the next year will be $190 million, if payments continue throughout the year.

In other words, we know where the men and women -- mainly men -- in the Iraqi regular army are located. They came for those payments, and we know how to locate them, should we make a decision to reconstitute units of that Iraqi army.

That money was well spent. There is ample evidence from other conflicts that unemployed former soldiers can be a destabilizing and a disruptive influence, as some believe is currently the case in Iraq today. In view of the $156 billion that is likely to be appropriated for U.S. military forces in Iraqi reconstruction in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, paying those sums to members of the old regular Iraqi army would be a modest expenditure.

But would it not make more sense to pay those sums to soldiers who are actually doing something? Would it not make sense to quickly reconstitute recently disbanded Iraqi regular army units to take on security tasks that are within their capabilities? Would it not be possible that recently disbanded Iraqi army units would be able to more quickly assume duties for which the border patrol, the facilities protection service, and the civil defense corps are intended, including patrolling Iraqi streets with our own soldiers?

Would this not more quickly give Iraqis the responsibility for and a stake in securing their own country? And, more importantly, wouldn't it be better for all concerned if primarily Iraqi soldiers and not Americans were acting to restore security in Iraq and dealing with those who would seek to disrupt it?

The Governing Council President thinks so.

I ask unanimous consent that an article written by the current President of the Iraqi Governing Council, Iyad Alawi, entitled "America Must Let Iraq Rebuild Itself," which appeared in the New York Times on October 19, be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

I asked Ambassador Bremer when we met with him: At a minimum, would he not raise this issue with the Governing Council to see whether or not the views of the President of the Governing Council, that the Iraqi army regular units should be reconstituted, represent the views of the Governing Council itself. We surely should listen to those views. These are the folks we put in office there as representing the Iraqi people. At a minimum, I urged Ambassador Bremer to find out formally from that Governing Council whether or not the President's views, as represented by this article in the New York Times -- that the regular units of the army, properly vetted to make sure we don't hire old members of the Saddam leadership -- should be reconstituted to help us maintain order and security in Iraq.

I believe Ambassador Bremer will in fact make that request of the Governing Council -- not the request to reconstitute the army, because I don't think Ambassador Bremer is there yet, but the request of the Governing Council to see if they agree that it would be wise for those units below the mid-level officer level to be reconstituted, properly vetted, to help us on the streets of Baghdad and in the areas which are very dangerous, and to take some of the pressure off our troops to make us less of a target and to have Iraqis gradually but more quickly take over their own security so that we are not a lightning rod for the folks who are trying to destroy us.

I look forward to the response of the Governing Council of Iraq to Ambassador Bremer's request. We know that as a new Iraqi army is formed, some of the existing units will be retrained and equipped to expand that army. But it is critically important that we have this question put before that Governing Council. The creation of a new Iraqi army is going very slowly. We are at less than a thousand. We must move more quickly.

The question is, since most of the members who we are hiring for that new army are members of the old army in any event, would it not be much quicker to reconstitute the units of that old army -- again, below the mid-officer level, so we don't have the Saddam regime involved -- would it not be much quicker to follow the suggestion of the President of the Governing Council, reconstitute the units and move on from there?

The Secretary of Defense asked, in his leaked memorandum, if what the U.S. is doing is enough and what else should be considered. I am glad he asked those questions. As I said before, I am sorry he has not said publicly what he said privately in terms of his doubts and concerns. But having said that, I am glad he is raising questions. I am glad he is asking questions about whether we should change course in some way.

I have written to the Secretary of Defense to solicit his views on Mr. Alawi's proposal. Again, I hope Ambassador Bremer does consult with the Iraqi Governing Council, seek their recommendations on this issue, and not only solicit their recommendations but seriously consider ways to formulate an integrated and comprehensive plan to move more quickly to involve Iraqis in their own security and in their overall governance.