Senate Floor Statement on the Nomination of General George W. Casey, Jr., to be Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, again, it is extraordinarily ironic that my good friend from Arizona says there is no one in a high position in this Government who thinks we are succeeding, when the President, just 2 or 3 months ago, said we are absolutely winning in Iraq. That is the Commander in Chief--a pretty high position of responsibility. The Vice President, just last year, said that the insurgency is in its last throes, when it was not. So it was clear to everybody, and apparently to my good friend from Arizona because he says he had seen this for years--failure after failure in Iraq--identified by the highest levels and the highest level of this administration as being a success.

Year after year, we were told this is a successful strategy. Now all of a sudden, a general who was assigned to carry out that strategy and did the best he could, acknowledging some mistakes in implementation, is going to be held accountable by some who will vote against his nomination for the massive failures at the highest levels of civilian authority. The strategy was wrong going into Iraq; it was poorly implemented. The Iraqi Army was disbanded. That was not General Casey; that was before he came.

The people who made those decisions were given awards and medals by the administration. George Tenet was given a medal for his work. He said the intelligence was a slam-dunk, that there were weapons of mass destruction.

Medal after medal was given to the civilian leaders. A Medal of Freedom was awarded to George Tenet. Ambassador Bremer was given a medal. He just disbanded the Iraqi Army and had a debaathification program, which was a complete failure because of its excess. He was given a Medal of Freedom.

William Haynes, General Counsel of the Department of Defense--his dubious legal judgment contributed to the interrogation abuses of detainees that led to the horrors of Abu Ghraib. He was given the Department of Defense medal for distinguished public service.

Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith, who hyped false intelligence used to justify the war in Iraq, was given a medal.

Now you have a general who was given a strategy and was told to implement the strategy. Yes, he was optimistic that it could work. He is in charge of the morale of his troops. Now, suddenly, some say he should be, in effect, punished. He should carry the burdens that properly should be carried by the top civilian leaders of this Nation. It is not appropriate.

It is not fair that General Casey be held responsible for massive failures that were caused by the wrong policies, the deceptions, the ignorance, the arrogance, and the cockiness of civilian leaders in this administration. It is just plain wrong that this all be heaped onto his back.

What do we know about General Casey? By the way, we know he is forthright and acknowledges his mistakes. There is not a commander I know of who does not acknowledge his mistakes. Every commander worth his or her salt acknowledges mistakes, and General Casey has done that. In fact, he has given us a list of mistakes. We asked him what went wrong that you contributed to, and he gave us a list very openly. But you cannot lay the chaos and the violence in Iraq on General Casey's doorstep. This belongs on the doorstep of the top civilian leaders of this country who went into Iraq the way they did, who didn't plan for an aftermath, who disbanded the Iraqi army, and who perpetrated some of the other mistakes that have put us in some of the positions that we are in, in Iraq.

General Casey is a long and distinguished servant in the military, including the position of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. This was preceded by assignments on the joint staff and a career commanding Infantry units at all levels, up to and including Division Command. He knows Iraq, he knows the challenges the Army faces in Iraq, he knows the Pentagon, and he knows the challenges he will be facing in the Pentagon if we confirm him. He has the knowledge and skills to carry out his primary responsibility as Chief of Staff, which is the training and equipping of soldiers, caring for them and their families.

I want to discuss two issues that have been raised. One is the general's decision to support an increase in U.S. forces in Iraq after previously opposing such an increase, and also the proposition that General Casey somehow or other should be denied this position because of mistakes that he may have made in Iraq.

First, the issue of additional troops. I pressed General Casey about this issue at his nomination hearing before the Armed Services Committee. He said his general view was that he agreed with General Abizaid's view that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future. That is something, it seems to me, that is key to those of us who oppose this surge. That goes to the heart of our argument--the fact that General Casey believed more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future.

So how is it that now General Casey supports the surge? That is the question I asked him:

Senator Levin: We asked General Abizaid back in November when he appeared before this committee whether we needed more troops or he supported more troops going to Iraq. And this is just last November. And this is what he said. He said that he met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps commander, General Dempsey. "We all talked together, and I said, `In your professional opinion, if you were to bring in more American troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq?' And they all said no. And the reason is because we want Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future."

I asked General Casey:

Now, General Abizaid said that he spoke to you and that his opinion reflected your opinion and all the other commanders. Was that true when he said that?

General Casey: I'm not exactly sure when in November it was, but it was.

Senator Levin: So you've changed your view since November?

General Casey: As I described in my opening testimony, Senator, in mid-November was when the reevaluation of the plan was taking place. So I suspect John and I talked before that. And that does reflect my general view on additional U.S. forces in Iraq.

Senator Levin: It reflects a general view, but then there was some kind of reevaluation which took place in mid-November.

General Casey: That's right, Senator. We're constantly reevaluating how we're doing and what we need.

Senator Levin: But that position that General Abizaid stated was your position when you spoke to him in early November presumably still remains your general view.

General Casey: That's correct.

Senator Levin: Well, if that's your general view, what is the change? Why are you modifying your general view for this surge?

General Casey: What has changed, Senator, are several things. One, the development of a plan, a new plan that was conceived by the Iraqis and worked in concert with us; so there is a plan that laid out requirements for those forces. So just to say do you need more forces is one thing; to say do you need more forces to execute this plan is quite another. And we do need an additional two brigades to implement that plan.

Now, there is a new plan, a plan that I very strongly disagree with, the surge plan of the President. It is a new plan given to the commanders, and they are now told, with this new plan, to insert troops into neighborhoods of Iraq, hold that territory, and have more American troops--many more--embedded with Iraqi forces. That is the plan. That is the Commander in Chief's decision.

Will that require more troops? And now General Casey gives his honest answer that it will require, in his judgment, two additional brigades.

General Abizaid says it will require more brigades, but General Casey said two. I give him credit for giving his honest opinion.

So what has changed? He still believes in general that putting more troops in there takes the Iraqis off the hook, but if you change your plan, you change your mission and you say, as the Commander in Chief has, that is now our mission, that is what we are going to do, it is obviously up to the commanders to say how many additional troops it would take to carry out that mission.

That is an honest response, and that is the response we expect of our leaders. But his general view has been correct, and so has General Abizaid's. More American troops is a mistake. It takes the Iraqis off the hook. It lessens the responsibility on them to do what only they can do with their military and with their political leaders.

People who have visited General Casey in Iraq--colleagues--have always found him to be honest about the situation in Iraq and true to the pledge that he would give Congress his personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power. And he did this again at his nomination hearing when he disagreed with the Commander in Chief's sudden epiphany that things are not going well in Iraq.

All of a sudden, now the Commander in Chief says we are on the road to slow failure. That is a new revelation. Until a few months ago, the Commander in Chief was telling the American people we are absolutely winning in Iraq. So now I pressed General Casey about that:

Do you agree with the President that now the situation in Iraq is maybe a slow failure?

He said:

I actually don't see it as a slow failure. I actually see it as slow progress.

Do I agree with his assessment? I do not. I have seen chaos in Iraq--consistent chaos, growing chaos. But do I admire an honest answer even when it disagrees with the Commander in Chief? I do. Even though I disagree with that answer, I think it was an honest answer that he gave to the committee.

What about denying him confirmation as Chief of Staff because of the mistakes he may have made? Again, I think this is an ironic argument given the fact that the architects of these policies, the architects of the major failures which led to the mess General Casey was assigned to clean up, are given medals--Medals of Freedom, medals by the Defense Department. They are given the medals, and now some will want to lay on General Casey's doorstep the mess that was not created by his policies but by the policies of others.

I want to read for the Record a statement of Senator Jim Webb on the Casey nomination. He is tied up in a hearing, and so I will read this very brief statement into the Record for Senator Webb:

Mr. President, I rise today to speak in support of GEN George Casey, Jr.'s, nomination as the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. General Casey's service to the Nation during a long career and his experiences in Iraq qualify him well to address the formidable challenges facing the U.S. Army today.

Questions have been raised regarding General Casey's tenure as commander of the Multinational Force-Iraq. The national strategy in Iraq was flawed even before the invasion, and attacks on General Casey's performance only divert attention from the true architects of that strategy.

The situation faced by General Casey in Iraq represents the classic conundrum of military service at the highest level of command. In this administration, it has not been unheard of for some officers who spoke too loudly, very often, to have lost their jobs. At the same time, to speak too softly often causes the military leader, rather than the civilian boss, to be blamed when things go wrong. While I believe strongly that military leaders should be held accountable, General Casey performed as well as one could expect given the strategy for the war's direction that he inherited when he reported to Baghdad.

I wonder, Mr. President, if there is any time remaining.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan has 25 seconds remaining.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Presiding Officer.

This is the conclusion of Senator Webb's statement:

The consequences of a failed U.S. national strategy should be raised at a far higher level than General Casey's in Iraq.

Mr. President, I urge my esteemed colleagues to support General Casey's nomination to be the next Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair.